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Money talks: moral economies of earning a living in neoliberal East Africa 
Jörg Wiegratz (University of Leeds)1 and Egle Cesnulyte (University of Warwick) 
 
Neoliberal restructuring has targeted not just the economy, but also polity, society and 
culture, in the name of creating capitalist market societies. The societal repercussions of 
neoliberal policy and reform in terms of moral economy remain understudied. This article 
seeks to address this gap by analysing moral economy characteristics and dynamics in 
neoliberalised communities, as perceived by traders in Uganda and sex workers in Kenya. 
The interview data reveals perceived drivers that contributed to a significant moral 
dominance of money, self-interest, short-termism, opportunism and pragmatism. Equally 
notable are a perceived (i) close interaction between political-economic and moral-
economic dynamics, and (ii) significant impact of the political-economic structure on 
moral agency. Respondents primarily referred to material factors usually closely linked 
to neoliberal reform, as key drivers of local moral economies. We thus speak of a 
neoliberalisation of moral economies, itself part of the wider process of embedding and 
locking-in of market society structures in the two countries. An improved political 
economy of moral economy can help keep track of this phenomenon.   
 
 
Introduction 
Neoliberalism understood as a particular ideology, policy, discourse, class project, 
governmentality, or social engineering project has been studied widely (see for an 
overview Harrison 2010, ch.1). Yet, a key aspect of neoliberal reforms remains 
understudied both in theoretical but especially empirical terms: moral economy; aka the 
dynamics concerning social practice and the morals, values, emotions and material 
structures that underpin them. This article explores perceptions concerning prevailing 
moral economies of earning a living among two actor groups which operate in precarious 
material circumstances in Uganda and Kenya. These are two countries that have 
undergone intensive neoliberal change for decades. T ǯ views and 
evaluations are based on their personal socio-economic experiences Ǯberalism-in-ǯȋǣ19).  
 
We adopt the interpretation that neoliberalisation is about the creation of fully-fledged 
market societies, a process that is generally characterised by the marketization of social 
relations, a power shift to capital, and a corresponding   ǯ
subjectivities, relationships and practices (idem 2005). Neoliberalism has been advanced 
via policy, programme and discourse (individual freedom, self-interest, free markets), 
and has usually triggered changes not only in the economy, but also polity, society and 
culture (Bush 2007; Harvey 2007; Mirowski 2013)ǤǡǮneoliberalismǯ - that is 
the repercussion of neoliberal reform - becomes present and embodied especially in 
social practice and discourse (Harrison 2010: 29). In our context this raises questions 
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related to the effect of neoliberalism on prevailing moral economies: How do people in 
neoliberalised communities/markets think about themselves and others, or their 
relationships with money? What set of social practices - as well as values and norms - is 
dominant, and why? What do people consider to be acceptable, proper, or necessary ways 
of earning a living, and treating others in the process? What are prevailing action 
justifications? 
 
The public and academic debate about neoliberalism, economic practice and morals has 
gathered pace in recent years; in part an outcome of the repeated revelations of cases of 
fraud and corruption in many neoliberalised societies and the questions these have 
raised about capitalism, business, the state, criminality and culture including morals 
(Wiegratz 2015). For instance, political philosopher Michael Sandel (2012) has made a 
noted intervention arguing that many capitalist societies have recently witnessed a 
process whereby market values have crowded out nonmarket norms and common 
practice was adjusted by further commercialization in a number of societal spheres. 
 
More generally, the topic of existing moralities in capitalist society is increasingly 
recognized as a key topic in anthropology and sociology (Heintz 2009; Hitlin and Vaisey 
2010; Sayer 2011; Fassin 2012), as well as in economics and moral psychology (Gintis et 
al. 2006; Doris et al. 2010). Yet, research which empirically investigates moral matters 
with reference to the everyday economic practices and related issues of class relations, 
surplus appropriation, power and poverty remain rare (Browne and Milgram 2009; 
Mandel and Humphrey 2002), especially outside debates about consumption, Fair Trade 
or cases such as organ transplants (Sanal 2011). Political economy has yet to produce its 
collection on morality, and empirically investigate, amongst others, the interaction 
between political economy and moral economy.  
 
A growing body of scholarship discusses moral change in rapidly transforming societies, 
for instance in formerly socialist countries (Zigon 2010; Swader 2013).  Zigon (2007) 
analyses ǯ -interpretations, re-assessments and re-negotiations of various 
moral dispositions and conceptions for their everyday life, when confronted with 
incidences of change. In area studies too, there is an emerging research into moral 
dynamics in neoliberalised societies. Africanist studies explore the moral 
economy/morality of corruption (Olivier de Sardan 1999), township youth (Swartz 
2009), ruling parties (Southall 2008), crime (Ran-Rubin 2008), xenophobic violence 
(Hickel 2014), informal economies (Meagher 2008), poverty and aid (Englund 2008), 
community life (Jones 2008; Vorhölter 2012), HIV (Dilger and Luig 2010; Prince 2012), 
sexualities (Spronk 2012; Valentine et al. 2013), or witchcraft (Stroeken 2010). These 
issue-based interventions remain fragmented and do not yet constitute an inter-
disciplinary and systematic debate on morality matters in, say, neoliberal Africa. Our 
article contributes to this emerging body of work by furthering discussion on perceived 
changes in socio-moral predispositions in the context of material realities influenced by 
neoliberal reforms. We lay out our analytical focus on moral economy, explain its 
usefulness for the study of neoliberalism, and proceed with a discussion of our data.     
 
Moral economies: past and present  
The study of moral economy is concerned with social practices and the moral norms, 
orientations, beliefs, evaluations, and priorities, as well as values, emotions and material 
structures that underpin them (Hann 2010, Wiegratz 2010). The term moral economy 
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was coined by Thompson (1971) and further popularised by Scott (1979). Both scholars 
analysed the moral expectations, views, reasoning and preferences of sub-altern classes 
- Ǯǯeighteenth century Ǯǯtwentieth century South East 
Asia - concerning proper economic order, relationships, practices and terms of exchange. ǯstudy, the term moral economy was assigned to the sub-ȋǮǯȌwhich tried to collectively defend and keep socially relevant their 
customary moral views concerning the economy in the face of pressures on relationships, 
practices and norms brought about by the rise of capitalist economy.  
 ǯstudy highlight a number of key issues about matters of moral economy that      ǯ  ǡ    and non-
neoliberal societies (Wiegratz 2011): (i) economic relationships and practices are shaped 
by sets of class-specific moral, social and professional norms, that is particular 
understandings of what constitutes appropriate, acceptable, good behaviour, (ii) 
different social actors (for example classes) with different interests and power capacities 
could have different views on these issues and thus be in conflict over matters of, say, 
proper market practice and (iii) class relations do not just have a particular economic and 
political but also moral character; the latter is contested and renegotiated, especially in 
times of economic crisis and change. Further, (iv) political economy shapes and interacts 
with moral economy and favours or puts under pressure particular social actors, and thus 
their respective moral-economic views and priorities, which has consequences 
concerning the dominant form of practices and their moral-economic character in 
particular time-place-settings (for example in a local market). In short, the moral 
economy of the market - including what is regarded as proper practice and what becomes 
actual practice - is contested, evolves, and is affected by political economic change. (v) 
The state, capital and the sub-altern play a role in (re-)regulating the moral-economic 
structures of a market. (vi) Pǯ comments about economic matters can be moral 
commentaries about the economy and social relations they live in.  
 
Finally, (vii) as capitalism advances, free profiteering from the vulnerability of others, and 
crisis in society more generally, has to be naturalised (aka made morally acceptable). 
Dǯ ? ?Ǯ-felt conviction that prices 
ought, in times of dearth, to be regulated, and that the profiteer put himself outside of ǯ ȋǣ 112, italic in original). Intimidating profiteering and reigning in on ǮǯǣǮ
prices meant swollen bellies and sick children whose food was coarse bread made up ǯȋ ? ? ?ȌǤOur analysis is informed by Thompsonǯ and runs against 
the background of the above points (especially i, iv-vii). 
 
The analytical term moral economy is increasingly adopted to a wider range of subject 
matters, for example to analyse the moral views of various social actors, or the moral 
underpinnings and dynamics of various industries, professions or social relations and 
societal phenomena (Edelman 2012). Studies of the moral economies of social groups and 
economic spheres that are affected by neoliberal policies and reforms remain rare 
though. Importantly, the term is now used as well to study not only the moral grammar Ǯǯȋas in pro-social) behaviour but also harmful or deceptive practice, for example 
the moral views of violent or fraudulent actors (Olivier de Sardan 1999; Wiegratz 2010; 
Karandinos et al. 2014; Whyte and Wiegratz forthcoming). 
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We follow the latter approach: our descriptive analysis of morals in capitalist social 
formations presumes that all economic practice has a moral underpinning and is 
embedded in moral structures and logics (Polanyi 1957; Thompson 1971). Any economic 
practice (be it to produce, exploit, trade, or defraud) can be analysed in that sense: that is 
the respective actorǯs view concerning action justification, proper and improper practice, 
treating others, or the distribution of benefit and harm (see also Bouhana and Wikström 
2008). Analytically speaking, one can always identify a specific justification that has some 
sort of moral connotation, when referring to economic practice. Self-interest or the need 
to feed the family might be invoked when justifying actions of taking advantage of a 
vulnerable person or overcharging someone. Thus, the existence of fraudulent practice 
does not signify the absence but presence of particular moral views and priorities 
(Wiegratz 2012). 
 
That said, we are interested in ǯviews on moral economy matters including their 
perceptions of the prevailing moral economy in a neoliberalised economy, that is their 
views concerning acceptable, proper, legitimate practice; treating others in economic 
interactions; dealing in one way or another with matters of honesty, fairness, solidarity, 
decency, care, self-interest (Keller 2006). These views Ǯǯare formed in a social 
process and Ǯǯ ȋ    ? ? ? ?Ȍ   ǡ ǡ 
reflections. This process is an interaction of the self with social structures and other 
human beings. Further, the moral views of a person or social group, and the articulations 
thereof, are shaped by their social position, experiences, life trajectories, and dilemmas. 
Hence, moral views are impacted by class, income, gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, 
identity, discourse, power, inequalities, education (Sayer 2010; Zigon 2010). In short, 
actually existing moralities are embedded in material, existential relationships (Englund 
2008), namely material life, conditions and change.  
 
Further, understanding a norm - whether an informal, practical, actual, professional, 
cultural norm - as a somehow socially constituted action justification (Keller 2006: 169) 
highlights the collective aspect of co- and re-producing as well as re-making justifications 
for economic behaviour and respective ways of relating with and treating others (and 
affecting their lives), while one is earning a living. Prevailing moral views and respective 
dynamics and changes - the (re-)making of local moral economies - are thus phenomena 
of a collective process.  
 
To focus on moral economy aspects of neoliberalism is analytically useful because it 
demands giving attention to: (i) the socio-cultural responses to liberalisation and the 
ways in which neoliberalism had repercussions at the level of social practice, norms and 
values (Harrison 2010; Wiegratz 2010), (ii) relevant experiences, understandings, 
reflections and modes of reasoning of various actor groups concerning different aspects 
of their lives in neoliberal social worlds, (iii) the interrelationships between socio-
cultural and political-economic dynamics, and (iv) the interactions between macro, meso 
and micro level repercussions of neoliberalism. Together, this aids an understanding of 
the socio-cultural dynamics, conflicts and struggles in neoliberal society and its cultural 
political economy. It also complements theoretical and desk-based analyses of the moral 
characteristics of neoliberal theory, ideology and society (Amable 2011; Sandel 2012; 
Rodrigues 2013).  
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The article uses empirical material from Uganda and Kenya Ȃ agricultural trade and sex 
trade respectively - to run the analysis. The Uganda data is from extensive interviews 
about moral economy aspects in agricultural trade in 2008-9 in the major town in the ǯǡ, and the surrounding districts. The wider study draws on 
about 180 semi-structured individual and group interviews in Kampala and Mbale area 
which were complemented by observations of market trading and attention to news and 
debates in media (Wiegratz 2011). Interviews were conducted with (i) farmers, (ii) 
(small-scale) middlemen, brokers and traders (hereafter: traders)2, and (iii) staff from 
large agro-buying companies, officials from state and donor agencies, NGOs and civil 
society organisations, staff from farmers, industry and other professional associations, 
religious leaders, journalists, academics and intellectuals and other observers. In this 
article, we analyse ǯf the moral economy of business/agricultural 
trade.  
 
The data for the Kenyan case study was collected during 2010-2011. Neoliberal policies 
and discourses were explored to show how they affect social, economic and patriarchal 
structures, and have subsequent gendered effects. The sex industries are analysed to 
show how women who are in a disadvantaged position in society manoeuvre the socio-
economic and patriarchal scene, how they Ǯ  ǯ (Kandiyoti 1988), 
and attempt to make a living or progress socially and economically through 
unconventional choices. Two types of interviews were conducted. The first group of 
interviewees consisted of representatives of various nongovernmental and 
governmental organisations, movements that work in various fields including gender, 
sexuality, health, poverty relief, and public policy in Nairobi and Mombasa. The second 
group of interviewees were Mombasa women engaged in the sex trade themselves and 
self-identifying as sex workers. Semi-structured interviews and collection of over forty 
life stories of women selling sex were complimented with observations (Cesnulyte 2013).  
 
The respondents we refer to below are small-scale economic actors who operate in a 
context characterised by a highly precarious material conditions and notable power 
asymmetries in the interactions with a number of other social actors, both state and non-
state. These class specific experiences of social life shape perceptions of moral economy 
matters (Sayer 2010). The article continues     ǯ perceptions 
concerning moral economy characteristics and dynamics in the Ugandan case study, 
followed by the Kenyan case study. We do not offer a full account of the perceptions of 
moral dynamics in these two countries, or even the respective sectors, but we use our 
interview data to carve out some key issues highlighted in the interviews. We focus on 
perceived forces and drivers that are said to shape the moral economies in which 
respondents operate.   
 
Neoliberalism in East African countries 
Kenya became one of the first African countries to accept IMF surveillance and to receive 
a World Bank structural adjustment loan in 1980. It started systematically to implement 
neoliberal policies in the early 1990s, and has continued with similar policies up to the 
present (Gibbon 1995; Braunstein 2012). Ugandaǯ   have gained pace 
since the late 1980s; now, the country is regarded as the African country that has adopted 
                                                          
2 They traded mostly in assortment of fruits and vegetable food items (cabbage, tomatoes, onions, beans, 
bananas, potatoes); coffee; cereals. A very few also traded in animals (chicken, goats, cows). Some traders 
were small coffee farmers too (for example 5-20 trees). 
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neoliberalism most extensively (Harrison 2006). A vast range of donor supported 
neoliberal reforms have been carried out across economy, polity and society in both 
countries. Almost all societal sub-systems have been reshaped: agriculture, banking and 
other economic sectors, collective economic institutions, state agencies responsible for 
social provisioning, political systems and general administrations, business regulatory 
institutions, police and judiciary, as well as education, health and arts systems.  
 
Extensive privatisation, liberalisation, re-regulation and commercialisation including the 
spread of commercial and private credit (for instance via micro-finance) have accelerated 
both ǯ  ǯ transformation into neoliberal market societies (Gibbon 
1996; Harrison 2005). In the 2000s, both governments (and parts of the commercial 
media) advanced a restructuring of the idea of society and public goods, underpinned by 
discourses that called upon people to leave behind Ǯ traditional African mind-setǯǡ
lower expectations regarding the state  and public provisions ȋǡǮ
state that is obliged to ǯǡ  
Presidency put it, Sunday Monitor 2011) and endorse capitalist commercial thinking, 
ambition, entrepreneurialism, individualism, determination and enjoyment by becoming ȋȌǮǯ, tough and financially savvy and taking care of oneself.  
 
Since the advent of neoliberalism, both countries have experienced sustained periods of 
official GDP growth and headcount poverty reduction. However, this is coupled with high 
overall poverty (and periods of food insecurity), dependency, significant (and regularly 
rising) levels of income inequality, crime, political corruption, economic trickery, 
inflation, unemployment and underemployment, and a decline in public service 
provisioning (Wrong 2009; Tripp 2010; Tangri and Mwenda 2013). As Were et al. (2005: 
50) point out, structural adjustment reforms disproportionally affected the poor Ǯǯ in winners and 
losers in the process. An analysis of the real monthly earnings of individuals with 
different levels of education in Kenya since 1978 shows that winners after neoliberal 
adjustment are highly skilled and university-educated individuals as their earnings 
increased with time. Unskilled and semi-skilled individuals Ǯǯ
who experienced significant losses as a consequence of the reforms (Manda 2004: 35-6). 
Generally, access to privatized healthcare and education, as well as paying for transport, 
food, housing, and electricity became extremely difficult for income poor East Africans, 
including our respondents. By the late 2000s, poverty headcount ratio was about 25-30 
per cent for Uganda and 45 per cent for Kenya; GNI per capita about 450USD and 900USD 
respectively (World Bank 2015). The media was filled with items about corruption, fraud, 
and moral crisis. We will proceed with exploring how moral economies affected the above 
processes looked from our respondentsǯ point of view.  
 
The case of Ugandan traders 
What did interviewed traders in the wider Mbale area perceive to be the key moral-
economic characteristics of the world of business in contemporary Uganda, and what did 
they perceive to be among the key factors that shaped this moral landscape? First, traders 
identified a high level of self-interest, individualism, short-termism, opportunism, 
mercilessness, economic ambitiousness, acquisitiveness, aggressiveness, shrewdness 
and dishonesty; a speedy monetarisation of life; and significant envy in the 
neighbourhood and among friends. Traders highlighted, secondly, a significant difficulty 
to sustain cooperative practice in economic and social life; in their view, practice 
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informed by notions of kindness, fairness, friendship, empathy, mercy, honesty, manners, 
trust, respect, care, social obligations, non-monetary social logics, or shame for wrong-
doing were hard to reproduce due to severe material pressures that favoured other 
logics.  
 
Traders articulated that this situation is an outcome of a number of factors such as: (i) 
liberal economic and social reforms, including government and donor projects that 
promoted extensive commercialisation, economic and social competition, individual 
rights and freedom, and a Ǯǯin economic and social life, (ii) the 
priorities and actions of key state actors and elites (self-interest, enrichment, corruption, 
neglect of population interests), and (iii) wider socio-economic changes, for example the 
impact of the media, including global TV.  
 
Neoliberal moral economies   
Traders highlighted that economic life in recent years had been characterized by severe 
economic uncertainty and need for money in the context of: rising prices of consumer 
goods and escalating expenditures on health, education, transport and shelter, as well as 
communication and lifestyle items; low profitability; need to meet business targets (and 
repay credits, accumulate, and so on); high indebtedness; a rising level of taxes, market 
dues, bribes, other extortion fees; a growing un- and under-employment due to the 
shortage of formal sector jobs and high levels of population growth; and a general 
increase in socio-economic competition. With annual population growth rates of 3 per 
cent, Uganda has one of the fastest growing and youngest populations in the world. The 
population has increased from six million in 1959 to almost 38 million in 2013 (World 
Bank 2015).   
 
Consequently, traders said many economically active people had little and dwindling 
actual incomes/profits while facing increased expenditure pressures to cater for the 
needs of their immediate and extended family. Competition and pressures in many 
economic spheres was said to be increasing due to more people starting petty business 
as a response to joblessness and poverty, as well as the many go-business campaigns of 
government, donors and NGOs that encouraged people to start a business and follow their 
aspirations. Wage employment in the region had declined for a long time and remained 
low, also due to de-industrialisation effect of the neoliberal reforms. Most small 
businesses were run with loans from formal and informal lending agencies including Ǯǯ
short-term payback time, starting almost immediately after the loan was received. Banks 
were known to be very determined when it comes to repossessing ǯassets in 
case of failure to meet re-payment schedules (New Vision 2010; Daily Monitor 2013).   
 
The result, traders observed, was a very intense need to chase money - mostly to survive 
and pay (some of) the bills, and at times to modestly improve well-being or eventually 
accumulate relatively small sums of capital. Money was said to be on the minds of 
everyone, almost all the time. People were worried about their economic insecurities and 
financial obligations including loans. One respondent noted:  
Those things of liberalization, privatization, and chasing people from jobs - people 
lost the element of togetherness. A person moves with so many things on their 
mind - loans, businesses, survival, paying for the children in school. So the 
individualism sets in; people are selling whatever they can put their hands on.  
8 
 
 
There was a perception of constant need and pressure to make money, whenever one has 
the opportunity and as much and as fast as possible, to accommodate for the financial 
demands and various risks that characterised life which in turn made people reportedly 
more likely to prioritise self-interest and personal gain than other-  Ǯǯeconomic exchange. The intense need to get hold of money was perceived as 
a key driver of why people do what they do (aka of action and of action justification); that 
is, as a reason to take advantage of, rather than act with restraint or in solidarity, in the 
face of a vulnerable trade counterpart, for example a desperate or little informed peasant 
that tries to sell produce. There were however variations concerning how different 
traders perceived and acted upon moral economies of poverty, precarity and emergency: 
some stated that they felt sorry for vulnerable producers and tried to strike, when 
materially possible, a compromise between the imperatives of personal survival/profit 
vs. solidarity and community among the poor. Others seemed to act in a more strictly self-
regarding way and had less concerns ǯȋaka: that is 
how markets works; this is how one makes a profit; the naïve need to be taught a lesson). 
Yet, it was regularly seen as difficult to manoeuvre the moral dilemmas of trying to 
generate small profits amidst severe poverty, social crisis and business challenges (see 
also Evers 1994).   
 
The moral-economic power of money 
It was repeatedly highlighted that survival logics - make money (almost) no matter how 
- were dominant given the severely difficult economic situation. You do what is required 
or, else, you and your dependents suffer immediate, tremendous and painful 
consequences. Brokers argued: Ǯ's a world of survival. If you are not sharp you cannot ǯǢǮǥǯ
pre-ǥǤǤǯǡǮȏȐǮǤǡǯǤThere Ǯǯǡself-
regarding way (everyone for themselves) and adopt hard/dishonest practice, squeeze the 
other, and not feel regretful about it; the end justifies the means. ǮThis thing of 
commercialization is in everything; it has made us change our ways so much because it is 
about life and death, you know. Things concerning life, you have no second thought, you 
either take what is available or you dieǥ ǥ gives you only two choices: 
cheat, misbehave and survive, or dieǯǤThe notion of necessity, a world-of-survival and a 
life-or-death option - and a general reference to broader exigencies Ȃ was deployed to 
discuss particular practices and related moral issues.   
 
The widespread notion that money had to be given priority over other considerations 
was also shaped by a number of observed trends in other sectors: for instance, having 
money meant being able to survive, and pay your way out of trouble concerning 
significantly commercialised and/or corrupt courts, police posts, hospitals, schools, and 
housing markets. Indeed, poor people regularly faced hard practice (including harsh 
sanctions), fraud, and intimidation in their interactions with respective institutions. 
Police officers, office clerks, nurses, doctors, and teachers faced their own economic 
pressures and problems in the context of low pay in public service; their salaries were 
delayed by weeks or even months at times. For those working in the private schools and 
hospitals, pay and contract security was regularly low. These precarious employment 
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conditions increased the pressure to charge something extra when one can and to exploit 
the counterpartǯ vulnerability. Such behaviour was a common feature of Ǯǯ sectors 
that traders interacted with in their professional and private life (Inspectorate of 
Government and Economic Policy Research Centre 2011; Transparency International and 
Michelsen Institute 2013).  
 
Banks and telecommunication companies were seen to be playing hard-ball too; with 
often high rates, non-transparent fees, or dubious charges for calls that were not made 
(Daily Monitor 2012; The Observer 2013; The East African 2014). Traders noted a strong 
link between the high-profit making strategies and resulting business practices of 
powerful economic actors (big banks, produce buyers, processing factories, 
supermarkets) and the rising pressures upon and resulting hardening of the economic 
relationships and interactions between ordinary actors. In other words, there were 
perceptions of moral-economic spillovers in-between different moral economies and 
cascade effects between powerful and subaltern actors: the moral economies between 
the powerful and the poor were shaping the moral economies between the poor, or, the 
moral economy of the banking sector (or the health sector, police, judiciary) were 
affecting the moral economy of agro-trade, and so on. Where market and community had 
to a significant extent become arenas for profit making and survival at the expense of 
others, one better comes out as a sharp winner, and not as a vulnerable, helpless and 
cornered loser. Consider this statement from a young trader:  
Today, manners are less important than money. One who has money is more 
respected than the poor. Also money today governs life. If you get a problem your 
good name or good manners cannot bail you out. It is money that does. So the 
young people know this and they maximize business. 
 
The quotes above highlight that in the midst of rising insecurity, uncertainty, risk, 
expenditures, money-mindedness of fellow citizens, and short-changing by the powerful, 
there was a perception that one needed money more than ever to survive or Ǯǯǡ ǯ ǡǡ
make and retain friends and social interactions. In an ever more monetised, 
commercialised, and unequal society, money was perceived as the chief signifier of 
(relative) power, respect and security - of the ability to arrest insecurity, free yourself 
(temporarily or more permanently) from poverty and other restraints, distance yourself ǮǯǮǯǮǯǤ Money had 
a highly decisive role in ordering and structuring relationships, priorities, thoughts, and 
practices. As the marketisation of society accelerated, so did the perceived power of 
money in shaping and dominating ever more societal realms, thereby putting under 
pressure other action shaping logics. Money was a driver of rethinking how one sees and ǡǯs action and moral commitments 
(Simmel 1995; Sørensen 2000). Thus, money - and the need and desire for it - was 
perceived to be a key driver of the neoliberal moral economy and related modes of 
thinking, feeling and acting.  
 
Further, there was another significant external force that traders perceived to be 
affecting their options in the trade with peasants: corruption and trickery across various 
state and private sectors. This was said to make it more likely that traders, after having 
paid their due to the powers that be, opted for hard or fraudulent practices too when they 
had a chance, for example in trade with vulnerable peasants. In light of endemic 
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corruption and fraud (as well as hard practice) in the formal sectors, interpretations such  Ǯ   these daysǯ informed the thinking about and use of trickery, or Ǯ-ǯin small-scale trade too.  
 ǡǡ Ǯǯ-off and powerful - such as the President, well-
known Ugandan politicians, tycoons and industrialists, or rich countries such as the US - Ǯǯ. Respondents referred to such exemplars in their talks: Ǯhave you heard ǥǯǡǮǥǯ. There was, in other words, a trickling down of practice and justification 
exemplars from the top. One traǣǮ ǥ not only traderǥ
is no upright person. Even others in other fields misbehave. Even in offices, professionals ǡǡȏȐǯǤ- shaped 
by experiences, public talks and regular press reports about corruption and fraud of the 
powerful that often made significant gains with impunity - made it more difficult to stick 
to and justify commitment to honest or modest trade practice. Foreign (often Western) 
films, series and shows available on TV/DVDs reinforced the message (and respondents 
noted a respective impact upon local moral world): the world is harsh and money-driven, 
and requires self-interested, aggressive and scheming behaviour - and little concern for 
counterparts - in economic matters. 
 
Finally, the money pressures and requirements that traders talked about were not just ǯǤ
driving factor was leisure life and the desires it created. Money was needed for 
telephoning, gambling, watching videos and football games of the English Premier League 
in video halls, drinking, or attracting and spending time with women. Many youth in 
particular were said to be eager to get their hand on quick and easy money.  
 
Self-interest as moral default position in times of change and uncertainty 
A further driver of the moral economy was fast societal change and the related 
uncertainties that characterise  Ǯ-ǯȋ  ? ? ? ?Ȍ. Such a society faces 
increasing difficulty to stabilise, however temporarily, its social institutions. According to ǡǮȏȐǡǲconǡǳ 
that is the shortening of the time-spans within which action orientations and social 
practices remain stable, is the most important effect of social acceleraǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?-7). 
Thus, when the dynamics of market, high-speed and post-conflict society merge, one can 
expect highly unsettling and unstable socio-cultural transformations, with significant ǯǡǤǣǮ
don't talk of morality. The world today is so dynamic and people are selfish and 
ambitious. But it is because of uncertainty: things change a lot; where you left the world    ?   ǤǯThe perceived link between ǯ
values/practices and the political-economic context is characteristic of the above and 
other statements of various respondents; aka a pronounced opting for self-interest was 
seen here not as innate to human beings but shaped by the material context. 
 
It can further be said that this trader Ȃ and other respondents who made similar 
observations - perceived the application of costly pro-social morals to a permanently 
shifting action scenario as increasingly unfeasible, implausible and ineffective; 
accelerated change reshapes the material and social worǮǯs stable 
moral judgements and commitments increasingly impossible and unrealistic. Thus, what 
is mostly Ǯǯwhere the sharp and vigilant persevere, is to apply 
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the morality of self-interest and money, knowing or assuming that pro-social morals in 
the neoliberal economy are for a significant part (considered) out-dated and 
unaffordable. Pro-social human bonds, and notions of inter-personal solidarity are fragile 
in the context of uncertainty (Bauman 2005). Note also that to claim that pro-social 
morality does not apply, or that no adult in contemporary society is moral or morally 
upright anymore advances moral flexibility (Swader 2009) and allows to morally justify 
a more self-interested course of action. Some respondents seemed to have internalised 
the neoliberal discourses - advanced by amongst others the President who advised 
Ugandans to tap any money opportunity (harvest what you ǡǮǮ, Ugandawiki 
2015) - concerning a determined focus on individualism, freedom, business plans, 
detecting and exploiting opportunity, profit maximisation; amidst poor, desperate 
and/or less informed counterparts, this translated into moralities of searching for and 
squeezing weak others.  
 
The case of Kenyan sex workers  
Selling sex is not a new phenomenon in Mombasa, or anywhere else. The new 
development in the contemporary commercial sex scene is the emergence of specific 
narratives that justify such an occupation and signify changing understandings within the 
group of women who sell sex, as well as in the wider community, of why such activity is 
acceptable. The related gradual change in moral dispositions is a result of many 
overlapping influences that came into being during neoliberal restructuring in Kenya and 
continue to-date including the monetarisation and commodification of various aspects of 
life, breaking informal support networks, and Western influences through NGOs and civil 
movements, among others. These influences will be explored in this section with 
reference to Kenya. 
 
The literature on women selling sex in Africa became dominated by the epidemiologic 
research which came about as a response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the last decades.  ǮǯǮǯ
when referring to all women selling sex. Social scientists who research gender and 
sexuality issues in the African context are cautioning against such an artificial creation of 
categories to identify groups of people and point to the way that such categories often do 
not adequately reflect social realities (Spronk 2012; also Haram 2004; Tamale 2011). 
Women who exchange sex for money do so for a variety of different reasons and in a 
variety of different ways: some do so in order to secure food for them and their families, ǮǯǮǯǢ  Ǯ ǯ      Ǣ   ǮȏȐȏȐǯ
(Van den Borne 2005: 272); while still others might be looking for husbands, initial 
capital to start businesses or be there for many other reasons that do not have much in ǮǯǤ 
 
The multi-layered nature of the sex trade scene and the fact that women who sell sex 
emphasise aspects of their identity that are different     Ǯ ǯ (such as a mother who has to take care of her children, for example) has been 
documented by scholars working in various parts of the world (Nencel 2001; Brennan 
2004; Van den Borne 2005). In the light of this academic conversation, the recent 
developments in Kenya, where a significant section of women selling sex have started to ǮǯǮǯ, suggest some shifts 
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in local moral economy. This section will explore some conditions and factors that 
influence such transformations, and situate those within wider patterns of change in     Ǯ  ǯ in the recent few decades marked by 
neoliberal economic restructuring.  
 
Context: women in the Mombasa sex scene 
Mombasa has always hosted women selling sex, because prostitution was one of very few 
ways for women to earn a living independently from a man and live in the town. However, 
both prostitution and the way such activities were referred to by women themselves and 
society has always carried a lot of ambiguities. First, as documented by anthropologists 
researching prostitution in colonial Kenya, sex trade was often a temporary activity for 
women (Bujra 1975, 1977; White 1990). Some women remarried after a period of 
prostitution, others returned to their home areas, or started depending on businesses 
they had created and lived off that income. The temporality of prostitution, and its ǯ
profession, but more of a strategy for a certain period of time. Women entered and left ǯ   Ǯ ǯ   Ȃ prostitutes would marry and 
become wives, and divorced or widowed women could become prostitutes and then 
remarry again.  
 
Another important ambiguity that characterises prostitution in colonial and independent ǯǤǡ
exchange have been always intertwined to a great degree in many societies (see Cole 
2009), and therefore merely receiving money for sex does not necessarily imply that a    Ǥ 	  ǡ    Ǯǯ   
useless in the context of urban African settlings by some scholars (Ferguson 1999; Hunter 
2002). Women who sell sex also frame their activities through the emphasis on 
traditional gender roles, social relations and avoid associations with commercial sex. For 
instance, colonial Malayas in Nairobi were providing domestic services such as food, bath, 
and conversation in addition to sexual intercourse, and it was these non-sexual 
recreational services that were emphasised by them (White 1990: 15). Such emphasis is 
in line with the notion of respectability that governed moral economies in East Africa at 
the time. Likewise, Malawian freelancer bar girls in the 1990s were not happy to associate ǡǣǮ
stores oǣǤǯǡǯǤǡǯǣ [men and women] ǯȋ
2005: 272). Being a respectable member of community meant helping others around you 
(family, kin, neighbours) and was at the centre of Kenyan moral economies (White 1990; 
Lonsdale 1992). 
 ǮǯǡǮǯǮǯ, and of a social relationship Ȃ and not strictly commercial 
transaction Ȃ were and still are often invoked by women when explaining their 
prostitution activities. Men are targeted by women because a relationship with them 
could end up in marriage, or allow a woman to secure initial capital for her business. Even 
though long-term relationships such as marriage are increasingly difficult to secure, 
prostitution activities were ǮǯǮǯ, to 
avoid association with commercialisation and keep the exchange of sex and money in the 
informal social sphere Ȃ as is acceptable in traditional moral economies. 
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             ǯ
Mombasa: women spend different periods of time in the trade depending on how 
successful they are, most of them often conceal their activities and adopt different 
identities at different contexts and avoid associations with a commercial sex trade. But 
during field research in Mombasa it became clear that there is also a small group of 
women who clearly identify themselves as sex workers, explain their occupation as a 
profession or work, and often claim that they are business ladies. This small group of 
women is the focus of this article. Cinderella (28 years old) is one such woman:  
 
Now I say this, I cannot show them [clients] in my house, this better [is] business. Now I only ȏȐǡǥǡǡ
another lady, and I find another man. Because I am a businesǤȏǥȐ
this, I love my job because, these sex workers, the job of sex workers, it is the one who pay my 
baby school fees and pays my house fees, I get food and there are many things that I do this 
month.  
 
Cinderella departs from her predecessors with her discourse: she is not fluid or 
ambiguous about her identity, but clearly identifies as a sex worker. She clearly frames 
prostitution as a commercial activity or work, by using the analogies of contract and 
business to explain the nature of her occupation. Cinderella is proud of her job, because 
it allows her to take good care of her household Ȃ send children to a private school, pay 
the bills and rent. Selling sex is framed as a morally acceptable occupation, a job, because ǡǡǤǯ
about her occupation are in line with neoliberal ideas of markets, money, corporate 
entrepreneurship and individual freedom to choose how to make money. They also 
constitute a break away from the older discourse concerning the priority of respect in the 
community and helping those around you. Cinderella and her colleagues, who share the 
same attitude to sex trade with her, mǯ
what is considered to be acceptable practice in making a living. We will further explore 
the main drivers for such a change as they have transpired in the last three decades. 
 
Monetarisation, commodification and the moral power of business 
Neoliberal restructuring had two important effects on Kenyan women. First, as in many 
places undergoing such reforms, a lot of services that were formerly available to the 
population were brought into the market sphere. Therefore, services that used to be 
available for free Ȃ such as education for example Ȃ suddenly became very expensive. This 
process of monetarisation is directly linked to the processes of commodification that also 
intensified at the same time. Precious (23 years old) explained the change this way: ǮLife 
is very hard. We need everything. And you know, everything, you buy Ȃ water, everything Ȃ I use money. Everything ǯ. Constant need for money was emphasised by all 
interviewed women, just as the increasing costs of living. Small amounts of money that 
used to be enough for families to survive are not sufficient today, as described by Queen 
Latifah (37 years old):  
 
ChangiǤǤǡǯǤ- food is Ǥǫ	ǤȏǥȐǡǤǡǡ
is very cheap. 5 [Kenyan shillings] can take you mboga (Swahili- vegetable), 5 [Ksh] can take 
you tomatoes. Now 5 [Ksh] is not to take you anything. Tomatoes is 10 bob now.   Before many 
tomatoes [was] 5 bob. Now 2 tomatoes [is] 10 bob. Before many sukuma (Swahili- greens) 
were 5 bob, now [for] 5 bob [you can get] no sukuma.  
14 
 
 
These changes in the material realities of many people, in tandem with growing economic 
insecurity, influenced changes in values that are perceived as important for people.  
 
In a difficult economic climate and a monetarised society where many people are 
struggling to make ends meet, a stable income has become a priority. Stable income is the 
only guarantee that you can afford to school your children, eat regularly and pay the bills. 
Moreoverǡǯ
that are linked to the ǯ
vulnerability to external price shocks. This is not to say that other values disappeared Ȃ 
many women voiced their willingness to help others, care for their kin and communities; 
however such actions are perceived as something that one does after securing material 
wellbeing for oneself. In such a situation, actions that were seen as moral or just in the 
older sense are seen as less important for a certain period of time Ȃ ǯ
improves. When Ritangeri (36 years old) was told that many people in Mombasa blame 
bad morality for the size of sex industries, she did not approve of that notionǣǮ
talk during the day, and at night they can sleep, and the trade will continue. So what else ǫǯȂ ǮǯǮǯnally Ȃ by invoking her responsibilities to take 
care of children. Nencel (2001: 224) observes that such a discourse of women engaging 
in prostitution in order to take care of their families is employed to construct an Ǯ ǯstitute. However, this logic extended beyond just 
women trading sex, because increasing segments of society have stopped asking 
questions regarding traditional morality, opting to      ǯ
neoliberalised Mombasa. 
 
Women who sell sex told stories about their good relationship with local communities, 
which stand in stark contrast with the public   Ǯ ǯ  in 
newspapers or public commentaries on the topic in Kenya. This conflict between 
discourse and reality can be explained by exploring the changes in material realities as 
already discussed Ȃ because of the importance of stable income, questions about morality 
are avoided. When choosing between secure stable income and making judgements about 
the respectability of the income, the financial aspect is emphasised and prioritised. This 
shows the importance of money in the monetarised society where processes of 
commodification are advanced, as highlighted in our Uganda section too. For instance, ǯ (31 years old) story narrates exactly such situation: 
 
You know, they [people] normally see [sex work] is normal. If you get a wazungu (Swahili- 
white men) is normal, yeah. But sometimes you hear your baby and another baby they call ǡǣǲǡǡmtoto wa Malayaǥǳ 
(Swahili- ȌǤǡǥa. No. Like ǡǥǣǲMalaya ǳǤ
doesn't want another married people, they only want sex workers, because sex workers they ǯǡǤa mzungu, they pay the house ǡǡǤǡǲ
house called Malaya ǳǤȋȌ 
 
Betty explains that the stigma about the way she earns her money is diminishing and that 
she gains acceptance from more people, especially in social contexts where she is the 
customerǤǯ
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the fact that selling sex is not fully accepted as a morally right occupation by parts of the ǡǯady prefers renting rooms to women who sell 
sex instead of families shows the importance of stable money flows. The relative financial 
stability of women who sell sex is preferred to the potential insecurities that other types 
of tenants might suffer. 
 
Betty also names people such as bouncers and waiters at the clubs, traders at the market, ǡǮǯǤ
because she is a good business partner and consumer in the Mombasa economy, also 
because she has money and spends it in her private and work related expenses: paying 
entrance to the clubs, bribes to the bouncers and waiters to help with clients, bribes to 
police to avoid harassment, fares for her trips; she also renews her outfit in the market 
on a regular basis and pays her rent on time.  
 
People benefiting from sex workersǯ spending is not a new phenomenonȂ as Bujra (1977: 
15) documents, colonial ǯ feasts were well attended by local communities. The 
new development is that local economies are increasingly monetarised and with the 
processes of commodification, which has brought many life spheres to markets, segments 
of local communities have started relying on the spending of women who earn from the 
sex trade to a significant extent. Thus, prostitution becomes increasingly normalised and 
is framed as business by the various actors of the local economy, further advancing the 
moral restructuring process and consolidating the normalisation of the new aspects of 
moral economy. Importantly, it is not just Betty who prioritises money over previously 
valued respectability; such perceptions prevail in parts of the community too. This 
reinforces our general point that moral economies are influenced and interact with local 
political economies, and are constructed through a social process of a collective norm co-
production and -remaking.      
 
Increasingly commodified and monetarised material realities, and the position that 
women selling sex occupy in them, can be also linked to changing self-perceptions of 
some sex workers. They start seeing their occupation as a job. For instance, Cinderella 
narrates her self-reliance this way: 
 
It is my work. AnǤǡǤǯǡǤȏǥȐ
is a day I went to California3Ǥǫǯ

of men there. Every lady I saw, every lady [was] dreaming, dreaming, ǥǣǮǡ
ǯǤ ǤȏǥȐWhen I went [out of] there, I came with a lot of money. I pay all 
myself. I did one, two terms [of] school fees, in one night I pay for my house. When I see [that], 
I go [and] buy a big cheeseburger. I was lucky, I was even singing on the road.  
 
The significant point in this narrative is not only the fact that selling sex is seen as a job, 
but also what kind of job: Cinderella is particularly happy about opportunities to earn 
quick money and make considerable profits Ȃ  in one night she can earn amounts of 
money that would otherwise take months to assemble. Such a narrative also echoes 
neoliberal discourse about markets: being in the right place at the right time to reap a big 
reward, entrepreneurial break through, short termism, pragmatism. The stable income is    ǯ ǡ         
                                                          
3 Not a real name of club. 
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security. It even allows her some luxury consumption such as a cheeseburger; the 
immediate reward after a successful night. Income earned through selling sex ensures ǯ      Ȃ she is a good entrepreneur, 
consumer, head of household, tenant and contributor to various local economies (via 
paying school fees, bills, rent). The highlighted processes of commodification, 
monetarisation and consumption are key influences popularising such a business-like 
attitude and changing perceptions about moral economies of Mombasa. 
 
Failing informal support networks and individualism in the reshaped moral 
economies 
 
Informal support networks played an important role in Kenyan moral economies. 
Wealthy individuals are considered to be virtuous when carrying out duties and 
providing for the extended networks of kin, clients and community (Lonsdale 1992: 352; 
Lynch forthcoming). With neoliberal public reforms many individuals who lost their job 
could no longer support their kin and thus, many informal support networks failed. From 
the perspective of women selling sex in Mombasa, this change had two important 
consequences. 	ǡ   ǯ        Ǥ
Second, it complicated their return to their rural home, because the family welcome can 
be quite chilly if a ǯǤ 
such a context, many interviewed women emphasised individualism as the only way 
forward. For instance, Miriam (31 years old), had a big family back home in rural Kenya. 
Still, she did not consider going back even if her situation in Mombasa was quite unstable: 
 
It is ǤȏǥȐȏȐǡ
[siblings] start fighting [with] me for this small land. It is better I look for my own. I struggle, 
if I get something, I can buy here. I can stay, than to go there to start fighting - ǯǤ
Because I have my daughter. If my daughter goes back to upcountry, to my brothers' place, 
they [will] not accept her. I say they will not accept her, if I have fight with them. But when I ǯǡǡǯǤcommunicating, ǯǤ 
 
In the context of shortage, scarce resources and social competition, informal kin networks 
fail to provide the support they traditionally used to. Individuals in uncertain situations 
learn that support from their families and kin networks is limited and unreliable. For this 
reason Miriam chooses to withdraw her claims to assets that she is entitled to. This 
withdrawal is significant in two ways: first, Miriam believes she can achieve 
independence and buy land via her occupation; second, the future interests of her 
daughter are secured through the family network Ȃ since she does not participate in the    ǯ ǡ   uld take care of her daughter, if need be. 
Miriam calculates that following the logic of the moral economy of immediate 
individualism (that implies a de-linking from complicated moral economies of kin) is ǯǤ 
 
Even though support from informal social networks might be limited when women are at 
the receiving end, the situation is different if women are doing relatively well. For 
instance, Maria (32 years old) used to be a strip-tease dancer, but since she is now too old 
to be hired by bars, she started selling sex. She went to work in a brothel in Turkey for six 
months in her recent past and was trying to decide whether to return there for another 
six month period: 
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That is why I am telling you, I have a lot of space to think. Because I go there [to Turkey], they ȏǯȐǤȏȐǡǤ
So they come and they don't know where the money comes from, they only think that that is 
from my dancing. But ǡǡǣǮǡǡǡǡǯǤǡǤ
can't say I don't have money, so I am stressed. That is why I am thinking to close my eyes [to 
the fact that she would have to sell sex every day for six months in Turkish brothel], and do 
that [go to Turkey]. But, when I think about the other side [working in difficult conditions in 
the brothel], I am still 50-50. I don't know. But according how nobody helps me, that's why I 
am confused. It is a very sad story of me.  
   
Many women struggle to maintain their kin networks and re-distribute their income. 
High pressure to share the income with a wide network of kin and little possibility to 
benefit from this network when life gets particularly difficult, means that some women 
start changing their ideas about their responsibility to care for an extended family and 
speak about individualism; it fosters their commitment to and dependency on the sex 
trade and respective morals of money making. Changing material conditions influence 
such a move towards individualism and are often justified with the neoliberal discourse 
that reached women through the NGO sector, as will be discussed further. The failure of 
informal support networks is an important factor in shaping the moral dispositions of 
women who sell sex as entrepreneurial individual agents. 
 
Neoliberal discourse, ideology and incentives in the NGO sector: professionalising the 
ǮǯȋȌ 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Kenya and elsewhere renewed the medicalised approach to 
African sexualities (Tamale 2011). A great number of NGOs and other kinds of foreign 
actors started researching and working with women selling sex. Such women (and the 
communities they were part of) became the target for extensive foreign interventions. 
The awareness-building and training programmes were more or less always also cultural 
interventions thǮǯǮǯǮ ǯ (Boesten 2011). Western or Western-funded organisations involved in this 
work came with their own agenda, understanding, blue-prints and working practices that 
were often in line with international discourses of empowerment, individual freedom, 
accountability, transparency. For instance, many of the organisations working in a health Ǯ ǯ
all women selling sex. While the work of such organisations has helped reversing HIV 
pandemics in Kenya, it has also helped to reshape the moral economy terrain, especially 
via influencing (popular) language.  
 
The new language - or neoliberal Newspeak, to ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
- that is used when referring to selling sex, as well as the infrastructure that surrounds 
HIV/AIDS industries, contribute to the normalisation of sex work as a profession, or as 
an identity that can be useful       ǯ 
advantage (for similar examples see Beckmann 2010; Boesten 2011). Women often use 
those new terms when seeking to secure benefits from the HIV/AIDS sector; and not 
because they necessarily see themselves as workers or always agree with the ideas of the ǯǤFor example, the group of women interviewed pointed out that ǡ Ǯǯ  ? ? ?
from one of the health organisations. When asked why that particular organisation pays 
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them, women explained that it is because they are sex workers, and as a result of that 
they get paid 100 Ksh for checking their health. Being a sex worker, in this case, means 
qualifying for a free health checkȂup and receiving 100 Ksh on Tuesdays, which 
contributes to professionalization and the social acceptability of selling sex.  
 
The internationally influenced medical infrastructure available for women (and men) 
selling sex and the strong neoliberal discourse of sex work and sex industries, mean that 
some individuals start capitalising on the identity of sex worker and frame this 
occupation as a profession in contemporary Mombasa. This group of women who do so 
are still not the majority in the sex scene since many other women selling sex maintain 
the traditional ambiguities and temporalities of the occupation. However, we argue that 
the emergence of this growing group of women in the sex scene is a sign of neoliberal 
moral economy structures and logics gaining ground; they now co-exist with those of the ǮǯǤ  
 
Conclusion  
Neoliberal policies, programmes and discourses can be seen to not only aim at reshaping 
power and accumulation structures but also the dominant set of social practices, values 
and norms in the affected societies (Harrison 2010; Wiegratz 2010). This article has shed 
light on moral economy characteristics and dynamics in neoliberalised social formations, 
as perceived by traders and sex workers in East Africa.   
Accordingly, a money rationale, individualism and short-termism was noted to be socially 
very powerful, while certain practices to earn a living are increasingly recognised as 
acceptable, necessary or legitimised ǯsevere need 
for money in a context of precarity, but also because they fit with broader strands of 
neoliberal-capitalist ideas and discourses, that is, individual material aspiration, success, 
status, and security.  
 
We also highlight that there was a perceived (i) close interaction between political-
economic and moral-economic dynamics, and (ii) significant impact of the political-
economic structure on moral agency. People primarily referred to material factors - for 
example job scarcity, economic insecurity and uncertainty, poverty, spending pressures, 
advancement ambitions - as key drivers of local moral economies; in other words, when 
they observed self-interested, hard or fraudulent practices of their fellow beings, they 
saw money talking. In that sense, we conclude that the social power of particular 
practices, norms and values depend on the actual and perceived relative material power 
of the structures and social institutions that underpin them. Note that the material factors 
that people highlighted to be relevant are regularly repercussions of neoliberal reforms; 
thus, we can speak of a neoliberalisation of moral economies. We have highlighted that 
the strategies and actions of powerful agencies (state, donors, NGOs) shaped and 
impacted Ȃ and therefore Ǯǯ- on this process.  
 
Finally, we have shown that the making of neoliberal moral economies is a collective 
process that has top-down and intra-bottom (and, though not the focus of the article, 
bottom-up, intra-Ȍǡǡǯȋ
and dynamic) experiences in and reflections upon the social world they operate in. As 
part of that process, some actors engage with and appropriate neoliberal discourses, 
norms and values according to their concrete position in, and experience of reality in 
neoliberalised social formations. Their moral views concerning economic practice, our 
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data shows, are influenced by personal background, experience and situation, and (re-
)formed within and against the historical and current political-economic context, as they 
perceive and act upon it. Both, personal and context issues are to a significant extent 
shaped by neoliberalism in the current conjuncture of the two case countries; another 
reason to talk of the neoliberalisation of moral economies - itself part of the wider process 
of embedding and locking-in market society structures. Further, pro-social morals 
continue to coexist in a varied relationship with other morals; it remains to be seen how 
aggravated crises affect these moral landscapes; that is the prevalence and authority of 
various morals.  Whatever the future holds, money making as well as livelihood and 
wealth (re-)production will remain reliant on social relations and interactions between 
humans, and thus embedded in different views about what is acceptable and 
unacceptable practice, and asymmetrical power structures within which differing views ǮǯǤThese views and structures can change. An improved political economy 
of moral economy can help explain the structures and processes linked to that social 
transformation.    
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